Volume 1, Issue 4, November 2017, Page: 88-92
On Norms and Principles in the Criminal Law in the Europe (In the Light of Polish Theory of Statutory Interpretation)
Michal Peno, Department of Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law, Faculty of Law and Administration, Szczecin University, Szczecin, Poland
Received: Aug. 13, 2017;       Accepted: Sep. 4, 2017;       Published: Oct. 9, 2017
DOI: 10.11648/j.ijes.20170104.11      View  1564      Downloads  79
Abstract
European Jurisprudence (theory of law), part of which is Polish law study, worked an interesting and original concept of law interpretation and legal principles, separate from influential today Anglo-Saxon achievements. It is easy to notice that norms are distinguished from principles under certain theoretical assumptions. These assumptions are presented in the first part of the paper. The concept of principles are discussed in the context of the so called principles of the criminal responsibility. Jurisprudence (the so called legal doctrine) in the Europe, that involves also Polish legal theoreticians, can formulate and develop complete and original (ie separate from influential Anglo-Saxon achievements) concept (or concepts) of the legal interpretation and legal principles. Moreover, according to the European legal tradition, the principles of criminal responsibility provide the one of the most important example of functions or roles of the principles in the legal system. It is needed to note that principles of criminal law are nothing more or less than principles of criminal liability (responsibility), and the “criminal responsibility” is the central concept in the criminal law studies.
Keywords
Criminal Responsibility, Legal Principles, Norms, Rules, Legal Interpretation, Polish Theory of Law, European Jurisprudence
To cite this article
Michal Peno, On Norms and Principles in the Criminal Law in the Europe (In the Light of Polish Theory of Statutory Interpretation), International Journal of European Studies. Vol. 1, No. 4, 2017, pp. 88-92. doi: 10.11648/j.ijes.20170104.11
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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